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Abstract
In this paper, we present a novel architecture that inte-
grates a deep hashing framework with a neural network de-
coder (NND) for application to face template protection. It
improves upon existing face template protection techniques
to provide better matching performance with one-shot and
multi-shot enrollment. A key novelty of our proposed archi-
tecture is that the framework can also be used with zero-shot
enrollment. This implies that our architecture does not need
to be re-trained even if a new subject is to be enrolled into
the system. The proposed architecture consists of two ma-
jor components: a deep hashing (DH) component, which
is used for robust mapping of face images to their corre-
sponding intermediate binary codes, and a NND compo-
nent, which corrects errors in the intermediate binary codes
that are caused by differences in the enrollment and probe
biometrics due to factors such as variation in pose, illumi-
nation, and other factors. The final binary code generated
by the NND is then cryptographically hashed and stored as
a secure face template in the database. The efficacy of our
approach with zero-shot, one-shot, and multi-shot enroll-
ments is shown for CMU-PIE, Extended Yale B, WVU mul-
timodal and Multi-PIE face databases. With zero-shot en-
rollment, the system achieves approximately 85% genuine
accept rates (GAR) at 0.01% false accept rate (FAR), and
with one-shot and multi-shot enrollments, it achieves ap-
proximately 99.95% GAR at 0.01% FAR, while providing a
high level of template security.
1. Introduction
The leakage of biometric information, such as a stored
template, to an adversary constitutes a serious threat to se-
curity and privacy because if an adversary gains access to
a biometric database, he can potentially obtain the stored
user information [27, 30, 32]. The attacker can use this in-
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formation to gain unauthorized access to a system, abuse the
biometric information for unintended purposes, and violate
user privacy [20]. Hence, biometric template protection is
an important issue and the main focus of this paper.
For a template to be secure, it must satisfy the important
properties of noninvertibility and cancelability. Noninvert-
ibility implies that it must be computationally difficult to
recover the original biometric data when a template is given
(e.g., compromised). Cancelability implies that if a tem-
plate gets compromised, it should be possible to revoke the
compromised template and generate a new template using a
different transformation. The fundamental challenge in de-
signing a biometric template protection scheme satisfying
the above properties is the high intra-user variability that
occurs due to signal variations in the multiple acquisitions
of the same biometric trait and also low inter-user variabil-
ity [33]. The high intra-user variability leads to high false
reject rate (FRR), while low inter-user variability leads to
high false accept rate (FAR) [26, 31].
Prior work in face template protection has tried to de-
crease the intra-user variability and increase the inter-user
variability by using multiple acquisitions of the user’s bio-
metric trait (multi-shot) during enrollment [10, 22, 23].
Pandey and Govindaraju [22] extract features from selected
local regions of the face followed by quantization and cryp-
tographic hashing to generate a final template. Although
the scheme benefits from secure hash functions, it suffers
from low matching accuracy. To overcome the shortcom-
ings in [22], Pandey et al. [23] provide another face tem-
plate protection algorithm, where unique maximum entropy
binary (MEB) codes are assigned to each user and these
MEB codes are used as labels to train a convolutional neu-
ral network (CNN) and learn the mapping from face im-
ages to MEB codes. The MEB code assigned to each user
is cryptographically hashed and stored as a template in the
database. This algorithm [23] suffers from a high FRR for
higher matching accuracy and moreover, it is only compat-
ible with multi-shot enrollment. To improve upon this al-
gorithm, Jindal et al. [10] use a deeper and better CNN for
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robust mapping of face images to binary codes with signifi-
cantly better matching performance and compatibility with
both one-shot and multi-shot enrollment.
In one-shot enrollment, strictly only one image is used
during enrollment and training, while in multi-shot enroll-
ment, multiple images are used during enrollment and train-
ing of the network. However, both the deep learning based
methods [10, 23] are not compatible with zero-shot enroll-
ment, wherein a subject not seen during training needs to
be enrolled into the system. For both of the above cited
methods, whenever a new subject needs to be enrolled, the
complete network needs to be retrained with the new subject
included into the training database.
To address the above problems, we propose an architec-
ture for face template protection by integrating a deep hash-
ing (DH) framework with a neural network decoder (NND).
Deep hashing is the application of deep learning to generate
compact binary vectors from raw image data and is gen-
erally used for fast image retrieval [2, 3, 11, 12, 15, 16, 28,
29, 35, 36]. In addition to using deep hashing to generate
binary codes, we use error correcting codes (ECC) as an
additional component. ECC is used to compensate for the
difference in enrollment and probe biometrics (arising from
variation in pose, illumination, noise in biometric capture).
Recent work has shown that the same kinds of neural net-
work architectures used for classification can also be used
to decode ECC codes [9, 17–19]. In this work, we integrate
a NND [18] into our deep hashing architecture as an ECC
component to improve the matching performance.
Specifically, our proposed architecture consists of two
major components: a DH component, which is used for ro-
bust mapping of face images to their intermediate binary
codes, and a NND component, which corrects errors in the
intermediate binary codes that are caused by differences in
the enrollment and probe biometrics due to factors such as
variation in pose, illumination, and other factors. The fi-
nal binary code generated by the NND component is then
cryptographically hashed and stored as the secure face tem-
plate in the database. We have used SHA3-512 as the cryp-
tographic hash function, since it is a current standard for
string-based passwords and provides strong security. The
template generated after cryptographic hashing has no cor-
relation with the binary codes generated at the output of the
NND. To improve the template security, we have also opti-
mized our deep hashing architecture by using an additional
loss function to maximize the entropy of the binary codes
being generated, which also helps to minimize the intra-user
variability and maximize the inter-user variability.
The advantage of using a NND instead of a conventional
ECC decoder is that implementing the decoder as a neural
network provides the benefit of using a similar architecture
as the DH component that generates the binary code, and
hence, it can be more efficiently jointly optimized and im-
plemented within a common framework. Another advan-
tage of using the NND is that it provides an opportunity to
jointly learn and optimize with respect to biometric datasets,
which are not necessarily characterized by Gaussian noise
as is assumed by a conventional decoder. Motivated by this,
in this paper, we have integrated our DH network with the
NND by using a joint optimization process to formulate
our novel face template protection architecture. This pro-
posed architecture can also be used with zero-shot enroll-
ment while still offering the potential to improve the match-
ing performance with one-shot and multi-shot enrollment.
To summarize, the main contributions of this paper are:
1. The development of a facial authentication system that
uses protected templates and can be used for zero-shot en-
rollment where a new subject not present during the training
can be enrolled into the system without a need to retrain the
deep learning framework.
2. Inclusion and optimization of the neural network
based decoder to compensate for the distortion in biomet-
ric measurements and the end-to-end joint optimization of
the overall system.
3. Overall improvement in the architecture for face tem-
plate protection provided by the state-of-the-art [10, 23] to
achieve comparable matching performance with one-shot
and multi-shot enrollment on PIE, Extended Yale B and
Multi-PIE databases.
2. Proposed Architecture
In this section, we present a system overview of the pro-
posed architecture, which is shown in Fig. 1, and also
present the enrollment and authentication procedure. The
architecture consists of two important components: a deep
hashing component and a neural network decoder compo-
nent. In this paper, we have implemented this architecture
for face biometrics. However this system could also be ex-
tended for use with other biometrics such as iris or finger-
print or a combination of multiple biometrics.
2.1. Deep Hashing Component
The main function of the deep hashing (DH) component
(which can interchangeably be called a deep hashing net-
work) is to map the input facial images to binary codes.
These binary codes are not pre-defined as in [10, 23] but
rather are generated as an output of the DH component.
This is one of the reasons why this framework can be used
with zero-shot enrollment as well. Let X = {xi}Ni=1 denote
N facial images and Y = {yi ∈ {0, 1}M}Ni=1 be their asso-
ciated label vectors, where M denotes the number of class
labels. An entry of the vector yi is 1 if an image xi belongs
to the corresponding class and 0 otherwise. The goal of
the DH component is to learn a mapping or a hash function
G : X −→ {0, 1}K×N , which maps a set of images to their
K-bit binary codes C = {ci} ∈ {0, 1}K×N , while preserv-
ing the semantic similarity among image data. Specifically,
in the DH component, we deploy a supervised hashing al-
gorithm that exploits semantic labels to create binary codes
with the following required properties: (1) The semantic
similarity between image labels is preserved in the binary
codes; images that share common class labels are mapped
to same (or close) binary codes. (2) The bits in a code are
evenly distributed, which means that the value of each bit
is equally likely to be 0 or 1, leading to high entropy and
discriminative binary codes.
With recent advances in deep learning, hash functions
can be constructed using a CNN that is capable of learning
semantic representations from input images. Our approach
is built on the existing deep VGG-19 model [25]. The ad-
vantage of our approach is that it can be implemented using
other deep models as well, such as AlexNet [14]. We intro-
duce our approach based on VGG-19. For our architecture,
we use only the first 16 convolutional layers of pre-trained
VGG-19. To the 16 convolutional layers, we add our own
fully connected layer fc1 and an output softmax layer. The
length of the fc1 layer depends upon the size of the binary
code K that we want to use for template generation. These
16 convolutional layers and the 1 fully connected layer fc1
will be termed as “Face-CNN”.
The output of the Face-CNN at fc1 is a feature vector of
unquantized values. This output at fc1 can be directly bina-
rized by thresholding at any numerical value or thresholding
at the population mean. However, this kind of thresholding
leads to a quantization loss, which results in sub-optimal bi-
nary codes. To account for this quantization loss and incor-
porate the deep representations into the hash function learn-
ing, we add a latent layer called hashing layer H with K
units to the top of layer fc1 (i.e., the layer immediately be-
fore the output layer), as illustrated in Fig. 2. This hashing
layer is fully connected to fc1 and uses the sigmoid activa-
tion function so that the outputs are between 0 and 1. The
main purpose of the hashing layer is to capture the quanti-
zation loss incurred while converting the extracted face fea-
tures (output of fc1 layer) into binary codes.
Let W(H) ∈ Rd×K denote the weights between fc1 and
the latent layer. For a given image xi with the feature vector
v(fc1)i ∈ Rd in layer fc1, the activations of the units in H
is given as v(H)i = σ(v
(fc1)
i W
(H) + b(H)), where v(H)i is
a K-dimensional vector, b(H) is the bias term and σ(.) is
the sigmoid activation defined as σ(z) = 1/(1+exp(−z)),
with z a real value.
The combination of the Face-CNN, the hashing layer and
the output softmax layer forms the DH network. The details
about the training of the DH network are given in Sec. 3.1
2.2. Neural Network Decoder Component
After training the DH network, we can directly binarize
the output of the hashing layer using a threshold of 0.5 and
use the result as a binary code. Henceforth, we will refer
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Figure 1: Block diagram of the proposed system. The NND
is shown in the figure. The DH is shown in Fig. 2
to the output of the hashing layer from the DH component
as an intermediate binary code. At this stage, we can cryp-
tographically hash the intermediate binary code and store
it as a secure template. However, cryptographic hashes are
extremely sensitive to noise and there is always some in-
herent noise and distortion in biometric measurements such
as variations in pose, illumination, or noise due to the bio-
metric capturing device, leading to differences in enroll-
ment and probe biometrics from the same subject. Due
to these differences, enrollment and probe biometrics from
the same subject may lead to different intermediate binary
codes at the output of the hashing layer, which may result
in the cryptographic hash mismatch and excessive false re-
jections. We need to compensate for this distortion in bio-
metric measurements to make the system more robust, im-
prove the matching performance, and provide another layer
of security. This is achieved by using error-correcting codes
(ECC). ECC can compensate for the biometric distortion by
forcing the enrollment and probe biometric to decode to the
same message, making the system more robust to noise in
the biometric measurements, which helps in improving the
matching performance.
While we could use a conventional ECC decoder at the
output of the hashing layer, such a decoder is only suitable
when the codewords are corrupted by Gaussian noise. Gen-
erally, the distortion in biometric measurements may not
necessarily be characterized by Gaussian noise. For this
reason, we need to be able to train our ECC decoder to be
optimized for biometric measurements.
Recent research in the field of ECC has focused on de-
signing a neural network architecture as an ECC decoder
[17, 18]. We can adapt such a neural network based ECC
decoder, train it, and use it as an ancillary component to
refine the intermediate binary codes generated by hashing
layer in the DH component. The advantage of using NND
instead of a conventional decoder is that it allows for a com-
mon architectural framework to be used for both the hashing
fc1
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Figure 2: Proposed Deep Hashing network.
framework (i.e., the DH) and the decoder, and it provides
an opportunity to jointly learn and optimize with respect to
biometric datasets, which are not necessarily characterized
simply by Gaussian noise as is assumed by conventional
decoders. For our application, we have chosen the NND
described in [18] as the basis for our neural network ECC
decoder to be integrated with the DH component. Due to
space limitations, we do not provide full details on the oper-
ation of NND, as details can be found in the original paper.
Rather, we focus our discussion on how the NND decoder
is integrated with our architecture and also discuss the dif-
ferences in training the NND relative to [18].
2.3. Enrollment and Authentication
During enrollment, the facial image of the user is cap-
tured, resized and is given as input (xi) to the trained DH
network as shown in Fig. 1. The intermediate binary code
vi(H) for the user is generated at the output of the hashing
layer of the DH network. This intermediate binary code
is fed through a trained NND network and the final binary
code ci for a given user is generated by simple threshold-
ing of the output of NND at 0.5. The final binary code is
cryptographically hashed using SHA3-512 to create the en-
rollment face template Te to be stored in the database. The
final binary code is not provided to the user or stored in an
unprotected form. Only the cryptographic hash of the final
binary code is stored as a template in the database. During
the authentication phase, a new sample of the enrolled user
is fed through the DH network and the output of the hashing
layer is fed through the NND to get the final binary code cp
for the probe. This final binary code is cryptographically
hashed using SHA3-512 to generate the probe template Tp,
which is compared with the enrollment template Te in the
matcher to generate a binary score of accept/reject nature.
3. Training of the Proposed Architecture
The architecture described in Sec. 2 is trained in three
stages. In Stage 1, we use a novel loss function to train
and learn the parameters of the DH component to gener-
ate intermediate binary codes at the output of the hashing
layer; in Stage 2, the intermediate binary codes from Stage
1 are passed through a conventional ECC decoder to gener-
ate the ground truth, which will be used to fine-tune a neural
network decoder (NND); in Stage 3, the NND decoder is
trained using the ground truth from Stage 2 and this NND is
then integrated with the DH component followed by a joint
optimization of the overall system.
3.1. Stage 1: Training the DH component
As discussed in the Sec. 2, the DH component consists
of Face-CNN (Conv1-Conv5+fc1), hashing layer H and the
output softmax layer. Before adding the hashing layer to
the DH component, the Face-CNN with the output softmax
layer is trained with the CASIA-Webface [34], which con-
tains 494,414 facial images corresponding to 10,575 sub-
jects. For training the Face-CNN, all the raw facial images
are first aligned in 2-D and cropped to a size of 224×224 be-
fore passing through the network [13]. The only other pre-
processing is subtracting the mean RGB value, computed
on the training set, from each pixel. The training is carried
out by optimizing the multinomial logistic regression ob-
jective using mini-batch gradient descent with momentum.
The number of nodes in the fully connected layer fc1 before
the softmax layer depends upon the size of the binary code
K. If K is 255, then the length of fc1 is 512, and if K is
1023, then the length of fc1 is 2048.
After the training of Face-CNN, the hashing layer is
added on top of the fc1 layer (i.e. just before the output soft-
max layer) to form the DH component. The database used
for training the DH component have been discussed in de-
tail in Sec. 4. For training the full DH component, we have
used a novel objective function, which helps in reducing the
quantization loss and also maximize the entropy to gener-
ate optimal and discriminative binary codes at the output of
the hashing layer. The objective function used for training
the DH component is a combination of classification loss,
quantization loss and entropy maximization loss. The clas-
sification loss has been added into the DH network by using
the softmax layer as shown in Fig. 2. E1(w) denotes the
objective function required to fulfill the classification task:
E1(w) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
Li(f(xi,w), yi) + λ||w||22, (1)
where the first termLi(.) is the classification loss for a train-
ing instance i and is described below, N is the number of
training images in a mini-batch. f(xi,w) is the predicted
softmax output of the network and is a function of the input
training image xi and the weights of the network w. The
second term is the regularization function where λ governs
the relative importance of the regularization. Let the pre-
dicted softmax output f(xi,w) be denoted by yˆi. The clas-
sification loss for the ith training instance is given as:
Li(yˆi, yi) = −
M∑
m=1
yi,m ln yˆi,m, (2)
where yi,m and yˆi,m is the ground truth and the prediction
result for the mth unit of the ith training instance, respec-
tively and M is the number of output units.
The output of the hashing layer is a K-dimensional vec-
tor denoted by v(H)i , corresponding to the i-th input image.
The n-th element of this vector is denoted by v(H)i,n (n =
1, 2, 3, · · · ,K). The value of v(H)i,n is in the range of [0, 1]
because it has been activated by the sigm activation. To cap-
ture the quantization loss of thresholding at 0.5 and make
the codes closer to either 0 or 1, we add a constraint of bina-
rization loss between the hashing layer activations and 0.5,
which is given by
∑N
i=1 ||v(H)i − 0.5e||2, where N is the
number of training images in a mini-batch and e is the K-
dimensional vector with all elements equal to 1. Let E2(w)
denote this constraint to boost the activations of the units in
the hashing layer to be closer to 0 or 1 and this constraint
needs to be maximized in order to push the binary codes
closer to 0 and 1:
E2(w) = − 1
K
N∑
i=1
||v(H)i − 0.5e||2. (3)
In the state-of-the-art face template protection methods
[10, 23], pre-defined maximum entropy binary codes have
been used as labels to train the deep CNNs. Maximum en-
tropy an important requirement for improving the discrim-
ination as well as improving the security. To include this
requirement into our architecture, it is important that the
binary codes at the output of the hashing layer have equal
number of 0’s and 1’s, which maximizes the entropy of the
discrete distribution and results in binary codes with bet-
ter discrimination. Let E3(w) denote the loss function that
forces the output of each node to have a 50% chance of be-
ing 0 or 1; E3(w) needs to be minimized to maximize the
entropy:
E3(w) =
N∑
i=1
(mean(v(H)i )− 0.5)2. (4)
The overall objective function to be minimized for a
semantics-preserving efficient binary codes is given as:
αE1(w) + βE2(w) + γE3(w), (5)
where α, β, and γ are the tuning parameters of each term.
The objective function given in (5) can be minimized by
using stochastic gradient descent (SGD) efficiently by di-
viding the training samples into batches.
3.2. Stage 2: Generating the Ground Truth for
Training the Neural Network Decoder
As already mentioned, we have used the NND from
[18] as our ECC component for added security and also to
make the system robust to variations in biometric measure-
ments, which would make the architecture applicable even
for zero-shot enrollment. The NND in [18] is optimized for
a Gaussian noise channel and the database used for training
the NND reflects various channel output realizations when
the zero codeword has been transmitted. However, for our
proposed system, the NND needs to be optimized for use
with biometric data, where the channel noise is character-
ized by the image distortions (e.g., pose variations, illumi-
nation variations and noise due to biometric capturing de-
vice) in different biometric images of the same subject. We
can create the input dataset for training the NND by using
the different facial images for the same subject. However,
there is a major issue that needs to be addressed for training
the NND with the facial images, and that is we do not have
the labels or the ground truth codewords that these input im-
ages need to be mapped to. An external conventional ECC
decoder can be used to generate the ground truth codewords
for this input dataset of facial images.
After training DH network in Stage 1, a number of fa-
cial images of subjects disjoint from the subjects used for
training the DH network are used for generating the ground
truth for training the NND. First, we use the trained DH net-
work to extract the binary vectors at the output of the hash-
ing layer (threshold the sigmoid activations at 0.5) for this
disjoint dataset. These extracted binary vectors are used as
input to a conventional ECC decoder for soft-decision de-
coding. Hard-limiting the output of the ECC decoder gen-
erates ground truth codewords that are used as labels for
optimizing the NND in Stage 3. While usually all the bi-
nary vectors of a given subject are mapped by the decoder
to the same codeword, it is possible that the vectors could be
mapped to different codewords. This is especially the case
when there are substantial differences in the variations of
the facial images for a given subject, or when the ECC code
is not sufficiently strong. In the case that the input binary
vectors get mapped to a plurality of codewords, the most
common of these codewords is used as the ground truth for
that subject.
3.3. Stage 3: Joint Optimization of Deep Hashing
and Neural Network Decoder
In Stage 3 of the training, first we train the NND using
the same procedure and database outlined in the original pa-
per [18]. Next, the NND is fine-tuned for our facial biomet-
ric data. For fine-tuning the NND, we use the same disjoint
dataset that was used for the ECC coventional decoder in
Stage 2. Similar to Stage 2, the input to NND is given by
the feature vectors generated at the output of the hashing
layer of the DH network and the labels are provided by the
decoded codewords generated by the conventional ECC de-
coder in Stage 2. We have used sigmoid activation for the
last layer of NND so that the final network output is in the
range [0, 1]. This makes it possible to train and fine-tune the
NND using binary cross-entropy loss function:
L(o, y) = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
yi log(oi) + (1− yi) log(1− oi), (6)
where oi, yi are the actual ith component of the NND output
and ground truth codeword (label), respectively.
After fine-tuning the NND, we integrate DH and NND
by discarding the softmax layer in the DH network and con-
necting the output of the hashing layer from DH as input to
NND to create and end-to-end face template protection ar-
chitecture. This overall system is then optimized end-to-end
using the same dataset as used for fine-tuning NND and also
the same cross-entropy loss function given in (6).
Indeed a key benefit of using NND over conventional
ECC decoding is that the NND can be trained to force all
the binary vectors of the same subject to be decoded to the
corresponding common codeword. This also helps for zero-
shot enrollment, where, even for the subjects not seen dur-
ing training, the trained NND will generally compensate for
the biometric distortion by forcing the enrollment and probe
biometric of a subject to decode to a common codeword.
4. Implementation and Evaluation
4.1. Databases and Data Augmentation
We use the following databases for our training and test-
ing of our proposed system. The first 3 datasets have been
used for a fair comparison with the state-of-the-art in face
template protection. The last dataset is used to test our sys-
tem on a modern large scale face recognition dataset:
1. The CMU PIE [24] database consists of 41,368 im-
ages of 68 subjects. These images have been taken under
13 different poses, 43 different illumination conditions, and
4 different expressions. We use 5 poses (p05, p07, p09,
p27, p29) and all illuminations variations for our training
and testing. We have used 50 subjects for training the DH
network with the hashing layer. Out of the remaining 18
subjects, 12 subjects have been used for training the NND
and fine-tuning the overall system end-to-end, and the re-
maining 6 subjects have been used for testing of zero shot
enrollment. For one shot and multi-shot, the train and test
data split is consistent with [10] for the 50 subjects.
2. The extended Yale Face [7] database contains 2,432
images corresponding to 38 subjects with frontal pose and
under different illumination conditions. We have used the
cropped version of the database as used in [23]. Out of the
38 subjects, we have used 22 subjects for training the DH
network with the hashing layer. Out of the remaining 16
subjects, 10 subjects have been used for training the NND
and fine-tuning the overall system from end-to-end, and the
remaining 6 subjects have been used for testing of zero shot
enrollment. Again, for multi-shot enrollment, the train and
test data split is consistent with [23] for the 22 subjects.
3. For the CMU Multi-PIE [8] database, we have just
used it to test the robustness of our overall system to change
in session and lighting conditions as in [23]. CMU Multi-
PIE database contains 750,000 images corresponding to 337
subjects under 4 different sessions, 15 view points and 19 il-
lumination conditions. As in [23], we have used the session
3 and session 4 with total of 198 common subjects. We have
chosen session 3 for enrollment and session 4 for testing.
We have used 125 subjects for training the DH network with
the hashing layer. Out of the remaining 73 subjects, 53 sub-
jects have been used for training the NND and fine-tuning
the overall system from end-to-end, and the remaining 20
subjects have been used for testing of zero shot enrollment.
4. The WVU multimodal dataset [1] was collected at
West Virginia University in year 2012 and 2013. The data
for the year 2013 and 2012 contain 61,300 and 70,100 facial
images in different poses corresponding to 1063 and 1200
subjects, respectively. There are 294 common subjects in
year 2012 and 2013 data. The unique 769 (1063-294) sub-
jects from 2013 dataset are used for training the DH com-
ponent. The remaining 294 common subjects from 2013
dataset are used for training the NND and fine-tuning the
overall system from end-to-end. For one shot, we randomly
select one image per user for training and the rest are used
for testing. For multi-shot, 10 images are randomly chosen
for training and the rest are used for testing. A subset of 50
subjects of the unique 900 subjects from the 2012 dataset
are used for testing of zero shot enrollment.
In order to have sufficient data for training our deep
learning algorithm, we use data augmentation. For
each facial image, we apply horizontal flip, scaling to
60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% to generate five augmented im-
ages [6, 21]. For each augmented image of size m ×m we
extract all possible crops of size n × n yielding as total of
(m − n + 1) × (m − n + 1) crops. Therefore, data aug-
mentation yields a total of 5× (m− n+ 1)× (m− n+ 1)
images for each face image. For our experiments, we have
chosen value of m = 224 and n = 221.
4.2. Details of the Code and Decoder
The intermediate binary code generated at the output of
hashing layer of the DH network is considered to be the
noisy codeword of some error correcting code (ECC) that
we can select and this noisy codeword can be decoded us-
ing the NND to generate the final hash code that is crypto-
graphically hashed and stored as template in the database.
We have used a BCH code as an ECC for our experiments.
The size of the BCH code that we can use for NND de-
pends upon the size of the intermediate binary code that
we want. For comparison with the state-of-the-art meth-
ods in [10, 23], we have used 255 and 1023 as the size of
the intermediate binary codes, which is also the size of the
final binary code used. The BCH codes that we have used
for NND are BCH(255,187), and BCH(1023,933). For the
external ECC decoder, we have used the BCH decoder from
the communication toolbox in MATLAB R©.
4.3. Experimental Set Up and Results
We use the GAR at different FAR as the evaluation met-
ric and we also report the equal error rate (EER). Since the
train-test splits are randomly generated, we report the mean
and standard deviation of the results for 5 random splits.
As discussed in Sec. 2.3, authentication is based on bi-
nary accept/reject by comparing the probe template Tp with
the enrolled template Te . However, this is not an ideal sce-
nario for an experimental testing of biometric authentication
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Figure 3: ROC curves with One-Shot and Multi-Shot enrollment for different datasets for K=255.
Database Enrollment Type K GAR@0.01%FAR EER
PIE
Zero-Shot 255 83.6± 2.1% 14.71± 0.83%1023 82.8± 1.83% 14.89± 0.77%
One-Shot 255 96.2± 0.98% 0.99± 0.12%1023 96.0± 1.12% 1.32± 0.40%
Multi-Shot 255 99.9± 0.06% 0.051± 0.022%1023 99.0± 0.88% 0.078± 0.016%
Yale
Zero-Shot 255 87.4± 1.46% 12.5± 0.98%1023 85.1± 1.98% 14.65± 1.23%
One-Shot 255 99.9± 0.03% 0.052± 0.023%1023 99.1± 0.18% 0.072± 0.034%
Multi-Shot 255 99.98± 0.005% 0.049± 0.015%1023 99.8± 0.09% 0.039± 0.012%
Multi-PIE
Zero-Shot 255 81.4± 2.32% 15.43± 1.08%1023 81.2± 2.18% 16.69± 1.21%
One-Shot 255 98.7± 0.99% 0.263± 0.10%1023 97.4± 0.94% 0.34± 0.13%
Multi-Shot 255 99.8± 0.17% 0.93± 0.11%1023 98.5± 0.43% 1.14± 0.13%
WVU Multimodal
Zero-Shot 255 88.7± 1.87% 10.32± 0.83%1023 88.1± 1.68% 11.32± 0.92%
One-Shot 255 97.5± 0.98% 0.42± 0.14%1023 97.23± 0.89% 0.51± 0.11%
Multi-Shot 255 99.7± 0.16% 0.11± 0.02%1023 98.5± 0.57% 0.48± 0.10%
Table 1: Authentication results for different datasets.
system as we need a tunable metric to adjust the false accept
rate (FAR) and false reject rate (FRR) of the system. For
this reason, we use several augmented images (as described
in Sec. 4.1) of each image presented for authentication, and
Tp is calculated for each augmented image, yielding a set of
templates T . Therefore, as given in [23], the final matching
score can be defined by the number of templates Tp in T
that match the stored template Te, scaled by the cardinality
of T . A threshold can then be applied to the matching score
to achieve a desired value of FAR/FRR.
For our experiments, the mean and standard deviation of
the EER, and the GAR at 0.01% FAR for 5 different train-
test splits, with zero-shot, one-shot, and multi-shot enroll-
ment, using binary code dimensions K = 255, 1023 have
been reported in Table 1. With zero-shot enrollment, we
achieve GARs up to ≈ 83% on CMU-PIE, ≈ 86% on Ex-
tended Yale, ≈ 81% on Multi-PIE, and ≈ 88% on Multi-
PIE with up to K = 1023 at the strict operating point
of 0.01% FAR. We also get high GARs in the range of
98− 99% for one shot and multi-shot on all the datasets. It
can be observed from the Table 1 that the results are stable
Method Enrollment Type K GAR@FAR EER
Hybrid Approach [5] Multi-Shot 210 90.61%@1%FAR 6.81%
BDA [4] Multi-Shot 76 96.38%@1%FAR -
MEB Encoding [23] Multi-Shot 256 93.22%@0%FAR 1.39%1024 90.13%@0%FAR 1.14%
Deep CNN [10]
Multi-Shot 256 97.35%@0%FAR 0.15%1024 96.53%@0%FAR 0.35%
One-Shot 256 91.91%@0.1%FAR 4.00%1024 91.34%@0.1%FAR 3.60%
Our Method
Multi-Shot 255 99.9%@0.01%FAR 0.051%1023 99.0%@0.01%FAR 0.078%
One-Shot 255 96.2%@0.01%FAR 0.99%1023 96.0%@0.01%FAR 1.32%
Zero-Shot 255 83.6%@0.01%FAR 14.71%1023 82.8%@0.01%FAR 14.89%
Table 2: Performance comparison for PIE dataset
with respect to parameter K as there is not drastic change
in GAR or the EER asK changes from 255 to 1023. There-
fore, this makes the parameter K totally selectable purely
on the basis of the required template security. The verifica-
tion performance using ROC curves is also shown in Fig. 3
for all the datasets using one-shot and multi-shot.
A comparison of our results with other face template pro-
tection algorithms on PIE dataset is shown in Table 2. Our
proposed method values are all shown in bold. For security
level, we compare our code dimensionality parameter K to
the equivalent parameter in the shown approaches. It can be
noted that we get a better matching performance and a lower
EER when compared to the other face template protection
schemes for both one-shot and multi-shot enrollment. For
one shot enrollment, we achieve 96.0%GAR@0.01%FAR
for K = 1023, which is ≈ 4.5% improvement in match-
ing performance compared to 91.34%GAR@0.1%FAR re-
ported in [10]. Even with zero-shot enrollment, we get good
matching performance and a respectable EER.
In order to show the importance of NND, we have com-
pared our complete architecture “DH + NND” with two
variations of our proposed system:1)Using the deep hash-
ing component with no NND, denoted as “DH−”. 2)DH
component with an external conventional decoder, denoted
as “DH +Decoder”. We tested these variations on WVU
multimodal dataset for one -shot and multi-shot enrollment
(a) Dictionary attack 1 (b) Dictionary attack 2 (c) Dictionary attack 3
Figure 4: Genuine and impostor distribution of for different dictionary attacks for K=255.
Enrollment Type Method
DH− DH +Decoder DH +NND(Our)
One-Shot 8.2% 1.83% 0.51%
Multi-Shot 6.61% 1.54% 0.48%
Table 3: EER comparison with other variations for WVU
multimodal dataset for 1023 bits
for 1023 bits. The EER results are shown in Table 3. We
can observe DH +NND gives the best result followed by
DH +Decoder and lastly DH−. We can see that using an
external decoder improves the performance by reducing the
EER by about 5% and using the NND further reduces EER
by 1.1%. The advantage with NND over external conven-
tional decoder is that it provides an opportunity to jointly
learn and optimize with respect to biometric datasets, which
are not necessarily characterized simply by Gaussian noise
as is assumed by a conventional decoder.
5. Security Analysis
This security analysis is based on a stolen template sce-
nario as reported in [23]. Given the template, the attacker’s
goal is to extract biometric information of the user. How-
ever, the template is generated using a cryptographic hash
function SHA-3 512 of the binary codes generated by the
the deep CNN (DH + NND). Morover, the binary codes
generated are neither stored nor provided to the user. Since
the SHA-3 512 is a one-way transformation, the attacker
will not be able to extract any information about the binary
codes from the protected template. The only way the at-
tacker can get the codes is by a brute force attack, where the
attacker would need to try all possible values of the code,
hash each one and compare them to the template.
There are two scenarios that need to be explored in the
case of brute force attack. The first scenario is when the
attacker has no access to the CNN parameters and the sec-
ond scenario is when the attacker has access to the CNN
parameters. In the scenario where the attacker has no ac-
cess to the CNN parameters, the search space for the brute
force attack would be 2K , i.e., the number of binary codes.
In this scenario, it is very important that the final binary
code should posses high entropy. The objective function
required to train the DH component also includes a loss
function for maximizing the entropy, which is shown in (3).
Therefore, the high entropy requirement is captured in the
training of the DH component. Additionally, to make the
search space larger for a brute force attack, we use a final
binary code with a minimum dimensionality of K = 255.
The brute force attack in this scenario would be computa-
tionally infeasible because even with K = 255, the search
space would be the order of 2255 or larger.
Now, let’s analyze the scenario where the attacker has
access to both the stolen face protected template and also
the CNN parameters. In this scenario, the attacker would
try to generate attacks in the input domain and exploit the
FAR of the system. To exploit the system FAR, the attacker
would try a dictionary attack using large set of faces. In the
proposed method, it is not straightforward to analyze the
reduction in the search space due to the knowledge of the
CNN parameters. However, measuring the minimal FAR
of the proposed method is a good indicator of the template
security. To evaluate the template security, we have used
the genuine and impostor distribution to measure the false
accepts, where all other users other than genuine are consid-
ered as impostors. The genuine and impostor distributions
for three types of dictionary attacks are shown in Fig. 4.
The three attacks are:(1) CMU-PIE as the genuine database
and Ext Yale as the attacker database. (2) Ext Yale as a gen-
uine database and frontal images of Multi-PIE as attacker
database (3) Multi-PIE as the genuine database and Ext Yale
as the attacker database. It can be seen that the impostor
scores are always zero and genuines tend to one, indicating
there are no false accepts in this scenario and the proposed
method does not easily accept external faces for enrolled
faces even if they are preprocessed under same conditions.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we present an algorithm that uses a combi-
nation of deep hashing and neural network based error cor-
rection to be implemented for face template protection. The
novelty of this algorithm is that it can even be used for zero-
shot enrollment, where the subject has not been seen during
training of the deep CNN and still can be enrolled. Addi-
tionally, we show a matching performance improvement of
≈ 4.5% for one-shot enrollment and ≈ 3% for multi-shot
enrollment when compared to related work, while providing
high template security.
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